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FEDERAL INCOME TAX FRAUD

UNDER

JOSEPH B. BYRNES

OUR SYSTEM of federal income taxation the taxpayer acts
as his own assessor in that he reviews his transactions, computes his tax, prepares his return and remits whatever tax may
be due, or claims a refund of tax already paid, as the case may be.
At first blush such a system would seem to indicate such a degree of
trust upon the part of the government as to amount to naivet6. But
this is not so. Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the
officers of the Treasury Department are given the power to examine
the books and records of the taxpayer and related persons for the purpose of determining the liability of the taxpayer and to assess the correct tax.1 This examination may be made at any time within three
years after the return is due,2 except that if the taxpayer has failed to
report as part of gross income a sum in excess of 25% of gross income
as stated in the return, an examination may be made at any time within
six years of the filing of the return.3 By agreement, the taxpayer and
the government may extend the period for examination and subsequent assessment.4
The examination of the taxpayer's return is made by a revenue
agent, either by a field audit or by an office audit of the taxpayer's
returns and related records. Such audit procedure follows a preliminary survey of all returns filed for the purpose of selecting those to be
subjected to examination either by reason of various items appearing
therein, the amount of income disclosed or by a desire on the part of
the government to apply sampling techniques to what may appear to
be innocuous returns.
A field audit involves a fairly complete examination of a taxpayer's
return at his place of business and is ordinarily undertaken in the case
where the related records would be too voluminous for examination
1 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68 A. Stat. 901 (1954),

26 U.S.C.A. 7602 (1954).

2 Ibid. at S 6501 (a).

8 Ibid. at S6501 (e).

4 Ibid. at 6501 (c).
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at the offices of the Internal Revenue Service. An office audit involves
the summoning of the taxpayer to meet the revenue agent at the latter's office and there to explain and justify relatively minor items appearing in the taxpayer's income tax return.
As delineated by the statute, the purpose of the examination is to
determine whether the tax disclosed upon the return is correct. This,
of course, depends upon whether the taxable income reported is correct. Taxable income, in turn, is a net figure arrived at by the interplay of items of income and deductions. The revenue agent devotes himself to a review of these items and the related records to
see whether the figures are substantiated in fact, and whether the
appropriate provisions of the Internal Revenue Code governing the
inclusion of income and the propriety of deductions have been observed by the taxpayer.
At the conclusion of the examination the revenue agent informs the
taxpayer of the results thereof. The information imparted may be
good news to the effect that the return as filed will be accepted or,
very rarely, that the taxpayer has paid too much and will receive a
refund of the excess tax paid. More often than not, the agent will inform the taxpayer that there exists a deficiency in tax based upon a
deficiency in taxable income as determined by the agent on the basis
of disallowing certain deductions claimed by the taxpayer or of including certain items of income omitted by the taxpayer, or both.
Confronted by a deficiency, the taxpayer may agree to an immediate assessment of the additional tax together with interest thereon at
the rate of six percent from the due date of the return. In the alternative, he may contest the issue of deficiency and pursue his remedies
through the various administrative levels of the Internal Revenue
Service and through the courts until such time as a final determination
is made of the matter. Absent fraud on the part of the taxpayer, there
will be no addition other than interest to the deficiency in the tax, unless it be determined that part of the deficiency is due to negligence
on the part of the taxpayer, in which case a penalty of five percent
may be imposed upon the entire deficiency.'
From the foregoing it may be readily gathered that the trust reposed
by the government in the taxpayer is far from unlimited and that the
taxpayer's return is subject to scrutiny and review toward the end of
bringing it in line with internal revenue laws and regulations, even in
5 Ibid. at S 6653 (a).
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a case where the taxpayer has acted innocently or ignorantly and
without any provable desire not to render unto Caesar his due. What
then of the taxpayer whose return is incorrect not on the basis of mistake but on the basis of deliberate intent not to pay the tax that he
knows to be due the government? What sanctions exist in such a case
and what can the government do in seeking to apply these sanctions?
This leads to a consideration of fraud under the internal revenue
laws. In this connection fraud differs not at all from fraud in the general sense of the term. Essentially it involves a knowing misrepresentation of a material fact to the detriment of one who has the right to
rely upon the representation. With respect to a federal tax return
these elements are found present and accounted for when the taxpayer
represents to the government by his return as filed that for a given
year his income was so much and his tax thereon was so much, when
he actually knows that for the period in question he had a taxable income in excess of that reported and a tax thereon greater than that declared. Parenthetically, it may be remarked that this substantially is
the language of the charge set forth in the usual income tax indictment.
Income tax fraud is a crime. As such it involves the element of intent, the mens rea. Absent intent, fraud does not exist. In many routine
examinations the agent may suspect that fraudulent intent has inspired
certain deductions subsequently disallowed in whole or in part because of a lack of substantiation. However, the absence of corroborating records does not connote the presence of fraud as an inevitable
conclusion, with the result that many taxpayers who have padded deductions with minor larcenous intent avoid dire consequences because
of the lack of adequate proof to establish their guilty purpose.
Proof of intent, therefore is a sine qua non in a case of criminal
fraud. Obviously, as in many other types of criminal cases, such proof
is often necessarily inferential or circumstantial, since the transgressor
in a crime of deceit does not ordinarily proclaim loudly to the world
either his intent to defraud the revenue or the fait accompli. Merely
negative acts such as the omission of items of income, or affirmative
acts such as the claiming of unsubstantiated deductions, do not in
themselves ground the element of intent. Rather, there must be proof
of design and evidence of a pattern underlying the actions of the taxpayer to obviate the equally tenable conclusion that the taxpayer's
derelictions were the result of inadvertence, ignorance or negligence.
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The "badges" or indicia of fraud are aptly described by Mr. Justice
Jackson in Spies v. United States,6 a landmark in the long range of
decisions on criminal tax fraud:
... By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would think affirmative willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as keeping a double set
of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or covering up sources of
income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions
of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or
to conceal. If the tax evasion motive plays any part in such conduct the offense
may be made out even though the conduct may also serve other purposes such as
concealment of other crime.

At this time it would be well to discuss and to differentiate, so far
as is possible, two terms often encountered in the field of federal taxation. One is "tax avoidance" the other, "tax evasion." Practically, the
most important distinction is that the one is permissible if not praiseworthy, while the other is subject to criminal prosecution. Despite
Mr. Justice Holmes to the contrary, 7 the ordinary person seeks to
minimize his tax liability and the desideratum in all tax "planning" is
the ideal of eating one's cake and having it, too. To the extent that the
goal is approached within limits permitted by law, we have tax avoidance. Should the strategem go beyond the law, tax evasion or fraud
ensues.
To illustrate. The taxpayer in the current year has realized substantial capital gains, his only income for the year. For the coming
year, he expects only ordinary income, i.e., income from wages, interest, dividends, etc. He is the owner of certain securities which now
have market value far below their purchase price and which, if sold,
will result in a loss greater than his gains. No reasonable hope for an
appreciation in their value exists. With tax avoidance as his motivation,
the taxpayer will sell his depreciated securities, wipe out his capital
gains, render himself nontaxable for the current year and carry over
his capital loss to reduce income for the coming year. If he wished
blindly to follow the ideal of Holmes, he could defer the realization of
his loss until the coming year, pay his tax on his capital gains for the
current year, and pay a tax on the income of the coming year reduced
only by that part of the capital loss available to him under the first
course of action. One way or the other, the taxpayer has acted legally,
and the only question is whether the payment of additional tax is a
6 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
7"I

like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization."
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work of praiseworthy supererogation. Possibly the best comment in
that regard is that of Judge Learned Hand:
Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he
is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.8

Now assume that the taxpayer has hopes that the depreciated secu-

rities will increase in value. He still wishes to eliminate his capital gains
and so, not too originally, reports a fictitious sale of his "cats and
dogs," naming as the purchaser either a non-existent person or some
one who in effect is merely his nominee. Here, quite obviously, is a
situation different from legitimate tax minimization or avoidance. In
the instant case we have evasion and fraud in that the sale is a sham
and there is a misrepresentation of what purport to be the facts.
Often the distinction between avoidance and evasion is difficult to
draw. Assume in the illustration given above that the taxpayer sells
his doubtful securities to his wife. On the authority of Sec. 267 I.R.C.
the tax avoidance would fail and the loss would be disallowed because of the relationship between vendor and vendee. As to whether
the transaction should be regarded as evasion would depend upon
whether it falls within the ambit of the remarks of Mr. Justice Jackson
in the Spies case. In other words, if the transaction was genuine in
fact, if the wife actually paid her husband the selling price and if the
husband honestly believed that he might claim the loss, no criminal
sanction should follow. On the other hand, if no payment was made
by the wife, if the securities were never transferred of record and if
all the circumstances surrounding the transaction created an aura of
falsity, the inference of evasion rather than of avoidance would be
well-founded.
No question exists that the motivation for both avoidance and evasion is mercenary. The distinction is both objective and subjective as
evidenced by the methods employed and the mental and volitional
approach of the taxpayer in choosing the methods. It is not impossible
to conceive of a taxpayer with the intent to evade accomplishing his
purpose by perfectly lawful means and thus avoiding punishment.
The occasional tragedy is that of the taxpayer, sans peur et sans reproche, losing his way in the mazes of the tax laws and fighting the
accusation of fraud despite the purity of his intentions. Comparable
would be the case of the man deliberately placing his automobile in a
restricted parking zone at a time when unknown to him the prohibi8

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. 2d 809 (C.A. 2d, 1934).
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tion does not apply, and that of the unwary motorist failing to see
the direction marker as he innocently drives down a one-way street
against oncoming traffic.
Without question many minor tax frauds pass without detection,
while others result merely in disallowances of the items involved because of lack of substantiation. Typical would be unwarranted increases in deductions claimed for charitable contributions or travel
and entertainment, items for which complete substantiation does not
ordinarily exist. A frequent device employed by the small taxpayer
imbued with a desire to save taxes is claiming a dependency exemption
to which he is not entitled. This may involve the creation of a new
entity or the listing of a family pet as a human being supported by
the taxpayer. Periodic sampling techniques by the Internal Revenue
Service and the impositions of penalties have had a restraining effect
upon this fictitious philoprogenitiveness.
Obviously, sound common sense and the application of the de mimimis principle forbid too much attention to the minor erring taxpayer. Nor is such attention necessary. The ordinary taxpayer is honest and seeks to file a correct return, and the aggregate peculations of
small taxpayers probably do not bulk too large in these days of multibillions collected in revenue. Moreover, there exists for the great number of taxpayers the standard deduction" which permits the blanket
and unitemized allowance of ten percent of adjusted gross income,
subject to a limitation of $1,000°' in lieu of the itemization of
so-called "personal" deductions. Without doubt, the standard deduction has removed temptation for many smaller taxpayers, thus saving
them from possible penalties.
The type of fraud with which the government is concerned is that
with some measure of magnitude, not that it follows that a small case
may not receive attention with a view toward prosecution. In addition, the case selected is ordinarily one where the evidence of intent is
clear or where reason exists to believe that such evidence can be developed or that the attempt in that direction should be made. Often
enough, an investigation may be instituted largely on the basis of
groundless suspicion, if one may believe the taxpayer involved.
The inception of a fraud case may occur during the course of a
regular or routine audit of a taxpayer's return. The revenue agent assigned to the examination discovers certain items in the taxpayer's
9

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, op. cit. supra at 141.

10 $500 in the case of a married taxpayer filing a separate return.
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records which point to the possibility that the return is fraudulent.
Again, the taxpayer may become involved when an agent checks his
records for verification of transactions with another taxpayer under
examination. A "rap" letter may also trigger a fraud investigation. A
disgruntled employee, a discarded mistress or even a wife may write a
letter to the Treasury Department in which the charge of tax irregularities is made. Occasionally, a "crank" letter will be received and
found to be fruitful. Some cases originate with items in the newspapers pointing to the display of means by persons of hitherto unknown wealth. Secretary Morgenthau, so the story goes, launched an
intensive tax fraud drive in the middle forties when he saw extravagant
spending at Florida resorts by persons alleged to have made fortunes
in the black market. Finally, those people who live on the fruits of
illegal and borderline activities are always potential subjects of investigation to determine whether they have failed to pay the tax upon
their ill-gotten gains.
At this juncture, a word on the means or mechanics of fraud may
well be in point. Taxable income, which is the measure of the tax
liability, is a final figure derived from basic arithmetical computations
involving items of income and deduction. Hence, the taxpayer seeking with fraudulent intent to understate his income, must necessarily
distort the figures that combine to produce the final figures of taxable
income. Basically, his maneuvers will fall into one or more of three
broad categories. He may understate gross income, he may exaggerate
deductions, or he may set up a false division of taxable income.
Understatement of gross income finds its expression most often in
the suppression of sales. The taxpayer will simply omit certain transactions with customers and thus fail to include these in his receipts as
reflected in his income tax return. The sales selected may be all or part
of the cash sales, or they may include all or part of sales to certain
customers on open account. Again, the taxpayer may have income
from sources other than his known business, and this income does not
find its way to the income tax return.
The overstatement of deductions needs little explanation. Items
such as entertainment which rarely have full substantiation are increased to a point far beyond that which might be reached by fair estimate for expenditures not supported by records. Completely fictitious
charges may appear and disbursements for personal expenses such as
vacations, clothing and jewelry, may be present, disguised as business
expense.
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Another means which affects gross income by means of improper
deduction is the overstatement of the cost of sales. This involves the
juggling of inventories and perhaps of purchases in order to claim that
goods sold have cost more than the taxpayer actually expended.
The diversion of taxable income derives its advantage from the progressive rates found in the income tax structure. A taxpayer in already
high brackets can testify most eloquently on the law of diminishing
returns since every dollar of additional income means less to him in
terms of retention. So, if he is dishonest, he may set up a complaisant
associate or employee as an ostensible partner in an enterprise, and
arrange for that employee to receive a substantial portion of what is
the taxpayer's own income. The person so chosen will make a return
of the income received as his own, pay the tax upon it at a much lower
rate than the dishonest taxpayer, and remit the balance to the instigator of the scheme. Rather rarely does the accomplice receive anything for his services. Again, diversion of income may be accomplished by having a nominee take sole title to income-producing property and remit the net proceeds after income taxes to the true owner.
Considerable ingenuity is displayed by dishonest taxpayers and
many of them undoubtedly pride themselves on the schemes that they
have devised. Unfortunately, however, it is almost impossible for a
taxpayer to conjure up a scheme or stratagem that has not already
come to the attention of the government. Solomon remarked that
there is nothing new under the sun and there is certainly nothing new
in terms of tax dishonesty, as a review of reported fraud cases will
disclose.
It should not be understood from the foregoing that an income tax
fraud case is transparent and that proof of fraud is easily come by. To
the contrary. Tax fraud is a crime of deception, the person who practices it is ordinarily endowed with more than a fair share of native
cunning, and every effort is made by him and those who, unfortunately, may lend him expert assistance, to disguise the crime. It is true
that many attempts at fraud are stupid and easily discernible. The
majority involve hard work by the investigating agents and some few
cases cannot be "cracked." In almost all instances, however, the guilty
taxpayer whose case is investigated will have a far from pleasant time,
with more than a fair likelihood that his wrongful actions will result
in heavy criminal or civil penalties or both.
Assuming that indications of fraud are found in the examination of
an income tax return by a revenue agent or that information is re-
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ceived to the effect that a certain taxpayer is guilty of evasion, what is
the procedure followed by the government to investigate and determine whether fraud was perpetrated both as a matter of fact and a
matter of law? Under these circumstances, the matter is referred to
the Intelligence Unit of the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury
Department. The prime function of the Intelligence Unit is to investigate all cases involving alleged frauds under the Internal Revenue
Code. Rare cases involve frauds with respect to gift, estate and excise
taxes. The overwhelming majority of the cases handled deal with
alleged fraud arising out of income taxes.
In a case where an agent has discovered indications of fraud during
a routine examination, he immediately terminates his examination and
confers with the special agent of the Intelligence Unit to whom the
case has been assigned. If the case originates through information received by the Intelligence Unit, a request is made by the local head of
that unit to have a revenue agent assigned to work with the special
agent charged with the case. Assignment of the agents for purposes of
collaboration on a case occurs only after a decision has been reached
by supervisory officials that an investigation is warranted by some
measure of probable cause.
Theoretically the special agent and the revenue agent have somewhat diverse functions leading to a common goal. The revenue agent
is charged with showing that a deficiency exists in fact, in other words,
with showing that an understatement of income, and hence of tax,
exists. The special agent's responsibility is to establish that the understatement is fraudulent and criminal in that it stems from deliberate
intent.
Actually the revenue agent and special agent work hand in hand
and assist each other in furthering their respective functions. Details
of the audit are primarily the job of the revenue agent, but where, as
is the case more often than not, the special agent is well qualified in
accounting and auditing procedures, the latter will often be found
poring over books of account. So, too, with the investigative aspects
of the case. These often involve an analysis of the records of persons
with whom the suspected taxpayer has done business, with the result
that the auditing skill of the revenue agent will be called upon to
establish discrepancies between the taxpayer's records and those of
persons with whom he has done business.
The question arises as to how serious is a referral of a taxpayer's
situation to the Intelligence Unit, Unqualifiedly, the answer is that it is
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most serious. Such a referral means that the government views askance
the taxpayer's returns and proposes to make a most searching investigation to determine their truth or falsity. At the very best, it means,
in the case of an innocent taxpayer (or one whose guilt cannot be
established), a protracted inquiry which will reach every phase of
the taxpayer's most secret life. At the worst, the taxpayer may have
to stand trial, with the attendant anguish and notoriety, and the strong
possibility of fine and imprisonment staring him in the face. In addition, whether or not indicted and convicted, he may receive a demand from the government for the taxes evaded, together with a fifty
percent civil fraud penalty and interest from the date of filing the
fraudulent return or returns.
As might be suspected, many criminal sanctions are found as penalties for attempted tax evasion. Reference to the individual income
tax return, Form 1040, will disclose a certification that the return has
been prepared under the penalties of perjury. This certification for
ten years or more has supplanted the requirement of notarization, certainly a forward step. So, if the government elects, it may indict the
erring taxpayer on this score and subject him to a fine not to exceed
$5,000 or imprisonment not to exceed three years, or both."
Ordinarily a taxpayer who is prosecuted for fraud will be indicted
under Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code, which reads as
follows:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.

The foregoing statute is noteworthy in a number of respects. The

qualification indicated by the word "attempts" is significant in that
the defendant cannot plead the failure of his endeavor. Also of greatest importance is the phrase "any tax." By virtue of this generality of
expression, the defendant may be found guilty when the tax in question is not his own. A typical instance is the one in which the taxpayer is charged not only with the attempt to evade his own tax but
also that of a close corporation dominated by him.
Only time can give the dishonest taxpayer sanctuary from criminal
prosecution. The statute 12 provides that a prosecution under Section
11Ibid. at § 7206 (1).
12 Ibid. at § 6531.
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7201 I.R.C. must be instituted within six years of the commission of
the offense, i.e., the filing of the fraudulent return. So, if a fraudulent
return was filed on March 10, 1956, the statute would run six years
from that date rather than from April 15, 1956, the due date, assuming
that the return was for a calendar year.
Evasion of tax is punishable not only by imprisonment and fine but
also by the imposition of civil penalties. The statute13 provides, in
effect, that if any part of a deficiency is due to fraud, there shall be
imposed a penalty of 50 percent of the entire deficiency in tax. Since it
frequently happens that a deficiency results not only from fraudulent
acts of the taxpayer but also from adjustments to the return that are
non-fraudulent or "technical," the effect of this penalty is to punish
that taxpayer for errors that would merely result in additional tax in
the case of an ordinary taxpayer.
Imposition of the 50 percent fraud penalty and assertion of the additional tax is never barred by the passage of time. 14 In other words,
if fraud can be proved, the government may demand the additional
tax and penalty at any time, even though the period has passed in
which either a routine examination or a criminal prosecution may be
instituted. The fraud penalty is exclusive of criminal action, with the
result that its assertion will ordinarily follow the conclusion of a
criminal trial for income tax evasion. Whether the taxpayer has been
acquitted or convicted in a criminal trial makes no difference in a proceeding to assert the civil fraud penalty."5
In addition to the penalty and deficiency in tax, interest will also
be demanded from the taxpayer. Often a fraud case may not be concluded in all its aspects until many years after the filing of the false
return. As a consequence, the taxpayer, who may have spent several
years in prison, may have a liability for interest and penalty equal to
the tax deficiency. When it is remembered that through this entire
period he has probably expended substantial sums for representation,
it may well be doubted that he now has the feeling of satisfaction
that he had when he filed the fraudulent return and contemplated
his savings in tax.
The above summary of sanction depicts the fate of the dishonest
taxpayer whose guilt can be established. The investigation conducted
by the special agent and the revenue agent will be directed toward the
3

Ibid. at 6653 (b).
14 Ibid. at
(c)ce,6501
(
U).
15 H-elvering v. Mitchell, 30.3 U.$, 391 (1938).
1
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imposition of the penalties if the facts disclosed tend to establish
evasion on the part of the taxpayer. If the facts tend to the contrary,
the case will be closed without prosecution, although the taxpayer
may be subject to the civil fraud penalty if proof is available to that
end. The taxpayer also may receive in effect a clean bill of health and
be subjected only to routine adjustments of his return. Regardless of
the result, the investigation will be thorough and even though the
taxpayer may escape both prison and penalty, he will devoutly pray
that he never again be subjected to the experience that he has gone
through.
It is not to be supposed that the investigating agents necessarily
have an easy time during the investigation. If fraud exists in fact, the
offending taxpayer has done everything to conceal the evidence.
Furthermore, the investigation differs from a routine examination in
that the burden of proof is upon the government and not upon the
taxpayer. Possibly, a qualification of the foregoing statement might
be in order, at least as a practical matter, to the extent that the occasional taxpayer often will seek most vehemently to justify himself
and so take the initiative by disclosing everything to the agents.
Again, too, the occasional agent seems to feel that the burden of proof
is always on the taxpayer and that the latter is guilty until such time
as he can establish his innocence. Despite these instances, however,
most fraud cases demand the utmost from the agents who often must
labor literally for years to establish their case.
The fundamental economics of every item having an income tax
consequence emphasize the vulnerability of the taxpayer who has
gone astray. No one makes money by dealing with himself and no
income is realized by transferring funds from one pocket to another.
Whenever and wherever a profit is made or reason exists to claim a
loss or a deduction, there must be a transaction between the taxpayer
and another entity. If the taxpayer suppresses all records to an incomeproducing activity, ordinarily it may be expected that the other person involved will have something bearing upon what has happened
and that, somewhere, the records of a financial institution will indicate what has happened. If a deduction is claimed, a payment is involved and the alleged recipient thereof will normally be able to shed
some ray of light to confirm or disprove the alleged expenditure.
Where profits have been received by another person under a doubtful
claim of right, records should be available to establish both the right
to receive and the retention of the sum in question.
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In other words, since the taxpayer engaged in economic and taxable activity must have dealings with other persons, his misrepresentations concerning these dealings are, at least in theory and in usual
practice, subject to refutation. With this as a guiding principle, the
agents assigned to the taxpayer's case will review his transactions as
reflected not only in his records but in the records of all with whom
he has come in contact. His customers will be interviewed to determine whether the sales to them as reflected on his books are correct,
and his suppliers will be checked to ascertain whether the deductions
claimed by him in this connection agree with their records. In effect
and in fact, the taxpayer's return and his supporting records are audited
in detail and nothing escapes scrutiny.
Normally, if the fraud is relatively simple in plan and execution,
serious discrepancies will appear. Customers will have furnished statements that their purchases were in excess of those shown by the taxpayer and suppliers will have denied most convincingly that their
transactions amounted to the sums claimed. If the discrepancies are
relatively numerous and extend over a considerable period of time,
a pattern unquestionably exists and it is rather obvious that intent is
pretty well established.
In the case of the more astute taxpayer, greater difficulty is to be
anticipated. If income has been omitted, clues pointing to such omission will not be found in the taxpayer's records. Rather than show a
partial record of sales to a customer the taxpayer will omit all reference
to any transactions with the customer and will suppress completely
all sales to that vendee. Cash sales may be radically understated and
the taxpayer may claim as expenses many cash disbursements. Despite
all this, the agents more often than not are able to establish quite
definitely what actually happened and to reconstruct, or to construct
for the first time, a reasonably correct profit and loss statement for
the taxpayer and his true tax liability.
The method outlined above is what may be termed the "specific
item" approach. By this method the government is able to show by
the testimony of witnesses and, usually, corroborative records, that
the items appearing in total upon the taxpayer's return are false, as
are the figures reflecting taxable income and tax liability. For example, if the testimony of a number of persons is adduced to show
that sales have been understated consistently, a fairly convincing
prima facie case has been made out, and the taxpayer will be hard put
to plead inadvertence or negligence as a defense.
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An occasional case arises when the "specific item" method is not
practical. This occurs most frequently in the case of the businessman
who has had numerous small cash transactions that are not readily
traceable, or in the case of the individual whose business activities are
of such a nature that individual transactions are cloaked in secrecy.
Typical of the first group is the small retailer who daily pockets a
portion of his cash receipts and destroys his cash register tapes, or the
professional man who religiously omits to record some of his cash fees.
The outstanding examples of the second group are those persons who
derive their income from illicit activities or those who have successfully operated in the past through the intermediary of nominees without any disclosure of their interests.
These latter cases where records of individual transactions are not
available are approached by one variant or another of the "net worth"
method. Reduced to simplest terms, this means that the taxpayer has
a net worth or is "worth" more than is explainable in terms of his
reported income and is therefore guilty of tax evasions. Perhaps the
thought sought to be conveyed can best be understood by a rather
elementary illustration, as follows:
N et worth, December 31, 1955 ..............................
$30,000
Less: N et worth, January 1, 1955 ............................
10,000
Increase ............................................... $20,000
Incom e reported, 1955 .............................
$15,000
Less: Income tax thereon .................
$3,000
Living expenses ......................
6,000
9,000
6,000
Unexplained increase in net worth ...........................

$14,000

In the above example the taxpayer's net worth has increased by
$20,000 during the year 1955. Of this increase $6,000 is explainable as
being available from the year's income after payment of income taxes
and disbursements for food, clothing, shelter and the like. This leaves
a balance of $14,000 deemed to be income for the current year unless
the taxpayer can show that such is not the case or that the government
has erred in its computations.
There can be little doubt that grievous is the lot of the taxpayer
against whom the government has proved numerous suppressions of
specific items of income. Just as grievous is the situation of the taxpayer who finds himself trapped by a convincing net worth computation. A mathematical demonstration is irrefutable and its conclusion
umassailable but only if the figures are correct and represent what they

FEDERAL INCOME TAX FRAUD

41

purport to represent. If one or more of the figures in a net worth analysis can be shown to be incorrect, the whole structure topples and
with it the inference of evasion. If one weak spot can be found in the
government's presentation of new worth, the taxpayer can loudly
proclaim his innocence of everything. In a specific item case, to the
contrary, refutation of one of a series of transactions still leaves the
others dangling over the taxpayer's head.
In the example supra, the government has given the taxpayer an
initial net worth of $10,000, a figure obtained from its investigation.
If the taxpayer can show that this figure is incorrect and that his
beginning net worth was greater, the unexplained increase in net
worth decreases or may disappear. If he can show that his expenditures
for living were less than the $6,000 set up by the government, he has
provided additional funds to explain his increased wealth. If he can
establish that in addition to the $15,000 reported as income for the
year 1955, he received gifts and inheritances, which are not subject
to income tax, he can fairly explain some or all of his net worth increase. Should the taxpayer show that he has unpaid loans not reflected
by the government, he has gone far in establishing that the final net
worth figure is not correct. Finally, if it is possible to show an error
in valuation in the final net worth or that the taxpayer holds part of
it as trustee or nominee, he has seriously damaged the government's
case.
The consequence of the foregoing is that the government's net
worth case is like a chain. Every link must stand attack and if the
taxpayer can break but one link, the entire chain is damaged if not
broken.
The so-called net worth case is in reality based upon the taxpayer's
increase in net worth and his expenditures, using the latter term to
mean funds disbursed for purposes other than the acquisition of assets.
At times there will be found a government case based upon expenditures alone, without an increase in net worth. For example, if a taxpayer spends $50,000 in a given year, reports an income of $10,000
and has an initial net worth of $5,000, the inference of unreported
income based upon expenditures is not unreasonable.
The measure of the increase in net worth may embrace many

things. Often the chief or only item may be bank deposits. Examination of the taxpayer's bank accounts may disclose credits far in excess
of those that may be accounted for in terms of reported incomes.
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Often the bank accounts may be in fictitious names or in the names
of nominees. It is true that bank deposits in themselves are not taxable income, but if the deposits can be related to economic activity,
the government will be held to have made out its case to the extent
that the deposits exceed reported income.16 The burden then becomes
that of the defendant to show that the deposits do not represent income and are explainable as non-taxable items, such as gifts, the proceeds of loans payable or loans receivable or that, actually, the money
involved is not that of the taxpayer but of some one else for whom
he is holding it.
The development of the net worth approach to income tax cases
has posed some interesting problems as to how far the government
must go and what it must establish to constitute a prima facie case.
At all times, of course, the burden is upon the government to prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The application of this fundamental rule to net worth cases, however, has resulted in conflicts of decisions, with the government generally prevailing. Notable exceptions
were the Fenwick 17 and Bryan 8 cases, in which it was held that the

government had failed to sustain the required degree of proof.
The Supreme Court had, in 1943, approved the use of the net
worth method in a case involving a gambler without records of his
activities. 9 The increasing use of the net worth method in later years
was extended to cases where the taxpayer has had records but where
the government has contended these records were inadequate to reflect true taxable income. The contention was advanced that the
government had no right to employ the net-worth approach in those
cases where the taxpayer maintained records that presumably disclosed his income. ° In many other cases the points at issue involved
the adequacy of the "starting point," the specific aspects of the case
to be proved by the government and the place where the defendant
must take the initiative.
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the Holland case 21 and three
1o Gleckman v. United States, 80 F. 2d 394 (C.A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied 297 U.S. 709

(1936).
17 177 F. 2d 488 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
18 175 F. 2d 223 (C.A. 5th, 1949).
'9 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
20 United States v. Williams, 208 F. 2d 457 (C.A. 3d, 1954).
21348 U.S. 121 (1954).
22 Friedberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 142 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348
U.S. 160 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
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related cases 22 bearing upon net worth. The general use tof the networth method was approved, subject, however, to the employment
of safeguards of the defendant's rights. In the Holland case, Mr.
Justice Clark, in a definitely didactic manner, lays down the criteria
to be followed in the development of this type of case. There is
little question that his remarks are addressed not only to the lower
courts but also to the personnel of the Treasury Department charged
with the development of tax fraud cases.
The court sanctioned the use of the net-worth method even in
those instances where the taxpayer had maintained records. It held
that a provable opening net-worth must be established and evidence
other than the taxpayer's testimony in this regard must be adduced.
Within reason, the government must eliminate the possibility that
non-income factors have produced the increase in net worth. Finally,
an increase in net worth coupled with proof of a likely source of income will justify a finding by the jury that the net worth increases
came from this source. It is emphasized by the court that the burden
of proof is always that of the government, and that it devolves upon
the trial court to see that instructions are given so that the jury is not
overwhelmed by sheer arithmetic.
Since the Holland case and its qualified approval of the net-worth
method, it may be expected that an even greater use of this means
will be employed for the detection of the taxpayer who cannot be
attacked by the specific-item method. Hence, unless such a taxpayer
is willing merely to hoard the fruits of his evasion and to worship his
money in the solitude of a vault, he may expect to be the subject of
vigorous investigation the moment he applies his funds to the acquisition of ascertainable assets.
As can be readily imagined, the agents assigned to a tax fraud case
are ordinarily well equipped by training and experience to undertake
the investigation and to follow whichever method of attack that will
lead to prosecution of the taxpayer and assessment of the additional
tax and penalty. Ordinarily the taxpayer is not apprised that an investigation rather than an examination is under way, and it will not
be until the passage of considerable time that he reaches the conclusion that the interest of the government in him is more than routine.
In the interim the agents may have completed the unshakable foundations of an impregnable case.
It is to be questioned whether it is consistent with the traditions of
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the American system that a criminal investigation be launched and that
the taxpayer be approached for information and records without ever
being formally advised of his constitutional rights not to incriminate
himself. This, though, seems to be the practice, and if the taxpayer
does surrender incriminating books and records and give information,
he is deemed to have waived his rights even though never informed of
28

them.

Although the failure to advise a taxpayer of the pendency of a
criminal investigation will not bar the use of the evidence that the
taxpayer might validly have withheld, a different result may be
reached in the situation in which the taxpayer is informed that no
criminal action is contemplated and that the agents are merely concerned with a routine examination. In other words, if the taxpayer, in
time-hallowed words, is lulled into a sense of false security by the
actions and the representations of the agents, any evidence so obtained
may be suppressed and, for all practical matters, the entire government case will become tainted by reason of the unfair tactics of the
agents.
Probably the outstanding case in this connection is In re Liebster,
a Pennsylvania District Court case. 24 In that case, the defendant, relying reasonably upon the belief that he was making a "voluntary disclosure" in accordance with the Treasury's then existent policy of
granting immunity in such situations, furnished the agents with extremely damaging information. Subsequently, criminal proceedings
were instituted and Liebster sought to suppress the evidence given by
him. His petition to suppress was granted. While this case is found
within the framework of rather unique circumstances, it may fairly
be considered as authority for the proposition that evidence furnished
or obtained upon the representation that it will not be used criminally
should be suppressed.
Normally, at the inception of an investigation and during its course,
the taxpayer's own records are the subject of close and repeated scrutiny. Vhether or not, in the case of an individual taxpayer, to permit
this scrutiny or to assert the taxpayer's constitutional rights, becomes
a problem that is part of the general question of cooperation, that is,
whether to assist the agents in their endeavors or to dare them to do
their worst without his help.
23
24

Nicola v. United States, 72 F. 2d 780 (C.A. 3d, 1934).
91 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa., 1950).
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It is not within the province of this article to decide the question,
since in an actual case many factors must be weighed and an unqualified and unvarying recommendation for procedure cannot be made.
As a practical matter, the damage often is done before the taxpayer
has any realization of what is going on. The agents have gone through
his books and records, have made the transcripts that they deem necessary, and have accumulated the "leads" which they intend to develop.
Again, the business entity involved may be a corporate one, with the
result that the individual involved cannot raise the question of constitutional immunity with respect to its records. Finally, the taxpayer
may be unwilling to admit in any fashion that his records contain anything that may be wrong and therefore does not wish to make the
tacit admission of guilt that may be involved by an assertion of constitutional rights.
Very often a taxpayer furnishes the basis for his conviction by his
own records and his attempts at explanation. However, the government does not rest content with what it may obtain from the taxpayer.
Every investigation is expanded to reach so far as possible every financial contact of the taxpayer, with the consequence that the corpus
delicti will be made out by other than the taxpayer's uncorroborated
admissions.
At all times the taxpayer may approach the agents to discuss the
case. In fact, sooner or later he will be asked to give his formal "explanation" of what he has done and not done. At this juncture it is
well to give thought as to what to do. It must never be forgotten
that the investigating officers are seeking to make a case against the
taxpayer if one can be made. They will not manufacture a case, of
course, but they will view with the skepticism of long experience any
explanation that is halting and unconvincing, let alone one that is obviously a tissue of fabrications. So, unless a taxpayer is willing to tell
the truth and can afford to tell the truth, he may well consider the
desirability of maintaining silence and avoiding the possibility of other
difficulties arising from giving of a false statement.25
In its search for information the government leaves few stones unturned. This zeal for knowledge is not matched by any desire to impart information. Unless the investigation fails somewhere along the
line, the defendant will not ordinarily know the full details of a case
against him short of the time when a criminal trial begins. As a con25 United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
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sequence, the evaluation of the government's case prior to indictment
will depend largely upon what the taxpayer recalls of his derelictions
and what his representative can glean from his client (often not too
much), from his own researches into the facts and circumstances, and
from what his experience can furnish as to what the agents may have
discovered.
As a rule contacts between the agents and the taxpayer's representative are, fairly frequent during the course of the investigation. The
agents are seeking additional information and the representative is
seeking to overcome their case, although often his efforts are reminiscent of a man groping in the dark. The difficulty here encountered
is met everywhere prior to indictment in that opposing the government's case inevitably involves the admission of certain facts that may
be damaging and, to a large extent, the assumption of the burden of
proof to establish the taxpayer's innocence.
Sooner or later, the investigation is concluded and the agent's report will be written, embodying the results of the inquiry. If the
investigation has been negative as regards criminality, the special agent
will normally disappear from the case and the revenue agent will take
over alone. It may be that evidence of fraud was discovered but not
in sufficient degree to warrant criminal prosecution. In that event the
civil fraud penalty will be asserted but, aside from that feature, the
case will progress fairly well in accordance with the procedure following routine examination, with some additional obstacles occasioned by the charge of fraud, if that extra element is present. The
taxpayer will learn generally the nature of the adjustments involved
and will have the opportunity to negotiate a settlement in conference
with the officers of the Treasury Department. If he files a petition
with the Tax Court and if the fraud penalty has been asserted, proof
of fraud will be the burden of the government.
Reason exists to believe that there are times when an income tax
investigation is ex parte and that the agents during the investigation
tend to ignore the possibilities of innocence on the part of the taxpayer. No ground for complaint exists, however, with respect to
what might be called the administrative "due process" that is available to the taxpayer. If the agents are deaf to what the taxpayer's
representative deems to be irrefutable, he may present his arguments
against prosecution in a conference with the local officials of the Intelligence Unit. Should he fail at this stage, he is given a further con-
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ference with an attorney assigned to the Enforcement Division of the
local Regional Counsel's office. This attorney has the responsibility
of reviewing the report for prosecution and deciding whether it
should go forward. If he can be convinced that the government does
not have a criminal case, he will recommend against prosecution or,
in the alternative, that additional investigation be undertaken to
strengthen the case, a not too desirable consequence.
Should the attorney decide in favor of prosecution, the case is then
forwarded for review by the Tax Division of the Department of
Justice, in Washington. There it is closely scrutinized, and the taxpayer is again given the opportunity for a conference in which he
may urge his points against prosecution. Needless to say, at any of
these conferences vague generalities and self-serving declarations will
not suffice. The taxpayer's arguments must be buttressed by proof
and his failure to overcome the government's position will result in
the case being forwarded to the appropriate United States' attorney
for prosecution. The probability is that all of these conferences are
matters of grace rather than of right and are of real advantage to the
taxpayer who can afford to make a full disclosure in order to establish
his innocence. For the taxpayer who cannot safely follow such a procedure, the most salutary consequence of discussing his case in conference is the decision that it is high time to prepare his criminal
defense.
Once in the hands of the United States' attorney, the case becomes
part of the grist of his mill. Presentation is made of the case to the
grand jury and indictment is followed by trial. Whether the case is
based upon specific items of evasion or upon net worth, the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of
the thorough investigations and the exhaustive reviews of the completed cases, the government secures an overwhelming majority of
convictions, many by plea of guilty.
Following the conclusion of the criminal case and the disposition
of the appeal, if any, the taxpayer will receive a notice of deficiency,
the so-called 30-day letter. The amount claimed ordinarily will exceed that disclosed at the criminal trial, because of the reason that for
purposes of prosecution the government ordinarily selects the more
glaring and the more readily provable items of evasion.
With the receipt of the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer is again
embarked upon another sea of troubles. If he has been found guilty
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in a criminal trial or has pleaded guilty, that circumstance is urged
against him. If prosecution did not ensue or if, mirabile dictu, he was
acquitted following trial, the government may still allege civil fraud,
even though the burden is upon it to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that fraud existed. The disposition of the civil case entails
conference after conference at one level or another of the Internal
Revenue Service and it may well be that the taxpayer will file his
petition in the Tax Court for a determination of the deficiency and
the propriety of the fraud penalty. In the meantime interest has been
running at six per cent, and when it is all over, the taxpayer is sadder,
possibly wiser, and certainly more than slightly poorer.
The conclusion of all this is a moral to the effect that the way of
the detected tax transgressor is hard and the fruits of tax evasion become ashes in his mouth. With succeeding years, the policy of the
government has become increasingly severe and more, rather than
fewer, prosecutions may be expected where any evidence of evasion
exists. Whether such a policy of severity is desirable may well be
debated. Temptation to evade is found in the progressively higher
rates and will undoubtedly continue to beckon enticingly to those who
find that sudden prosperity is more than overmatched by the exaction
of taxes. No doubt there will always be those who will seek to evade
no matter what the tax or punishment may be. On the other hand,
there are others for whom punishment might well fall short of indictment and disgrace. Concededly, practical difficulties exist in drawing
a line of demarcation, but an attempt in this direction might well
serve the ends of justice, particularly when the heavy civil penalties
are remembered.
Not too many years ago, administrative discretion did exist and all
cases of criminality were not prosecuted. When a taxpayer could
show with some degree of plausibility that standing trial would endanger life or health, prosecution was not recommended and the case
was closed on the basis of tax and penalty. Abandonment of this policy
by the government occurred early in 1953, with the result that today
a moribund taxpayer could meet judge and jury only shortly before
answering to a higher tribunal for his offenses. Actually, it is to be
doubted that any judge would order a bedfast taxpayer to trial, and
it is probably better that the decision as to the deferment or abandonment of prosecution on grounds of health be reached sub judice.
Also, prior to 1952, there existed the "voluntary disclosure" policy.
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In effect, this provided that a taxpayer, prior to examination of his
returns or the start of an investigation, might appear before the
Treasury Department, beat his breast in contrition, and inform that
agency of the nature, the extent and the details of his tax evasions,
together with his willingness to atone in terms of paying up to the
last cent for his wrongdoing. An investigation would thereupon be
instituted and if it were found that the taxpayer had made a substantially correct disclosure, prosecution was not recommended and
the taxpayer went his way after paying the deficiency in tax and the
fraud penalty, together with the statutory interest.
Practical difficulties interfered with the sound administration of this
plan, not the least of which were the conditions laid down by the
government so that the taxpayer might avail himself of this opportunity to purge his guilt. The voluntary disclosure policy was rescinded
in January, 1952, and from that time on a guilty taxpayer for six years
must count anxiously the days since he was guilty of filing a fraudulent return on which the government may indict.
Abandonment of this policy is to be regretted in certain instances.
From time to time a taxpayer, moved by grace or fear of punishment,
seeks advice as to how he may make his peace and pay up what he
owes to the Director of Internal Revenue. Absent the locus penitentiae
previously afforded by the voluntary disclosure policy, he risks indictment by the filing of amended returns and presents a serious problem
to whomever he turns for advice. If some measure of relief could be
afforded in cases of this type, it definitely could be urged that little
would be lost by the foregoing of criminal prosecution of a prodigal
son who has returned to the fold of honest taxpayers.
Within the Internal Revenue Service itself, there is evidence of this
tendency to deal severely with the erring taxpayer. "Scandals" involving Treasury personnel in recent years have been highlighted, and a
very strong attempt has been made by the Internal Revenue service to
supply the answer to the age-old question of, "Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?" The consequence is an inclination, based on prudence, to
resolve doubtful cases against the taxpayer and to recommend for
prosecution matters that in the past might have been considered suitable for settlement.
All things considered, the taxpayer who today is suspected of income tax evasion, may anticipate a period of storm and stress, of anxiety and uncertainty. To the extent that he has transgressed there is
strong probability that he will be required to pay the penalty in terms
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of liberty and money. To the degree that he has erred by negligence
he may be required to make every effort to show the absence of intent
as an element of his actions. In either event, he requires and should
have capable representation. To outline, if only superficially, what
may be expected in the course of this representation has been the purpose of this article.

